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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 Alan Wayne Wellard was a passenger in a vehicle during a traffic stop. He 
initially consented to a search of his person, but he asserts that he revoked his consent 
upon further discussion with the police. Despite Mr. Wellard’s revocation, the police 
searched him, found a scale, and arrested him. Subsequent searches of his person 
uncovered drugs and paraphernalia. Mr. Wellard moved to suppress the evidence from 
the search. The district court denied the motion. Mr. Wellard then pled guilty to 
possession of a controlled substance, reserving his right to appeal the district court’s 
denial of his motion. Mr. Wellard now appeals from the district court’s judgment of 
conviction, asserting the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress. 
 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
 A Fort Hall police officer conducted a traffic stop of a vehicle for an expired 
license tag. (R., pp.157–58.) The driver consented to a search of the vehicle. 
(R., p.159.) Mr. Wellard was in the passenger seat. (R., p.158.) Mr. Wellard gave the 
officer the name “James Marshall.” (R., p.158.) Another police officer, Bingham County 
Deputy Lawrence Henrie, arrived on the scene and took over the stop. (R., p.158.)   
Deputy Henrie asked Mr. Wellard to step out of the vehicle, and Mr. Wellard 
complied. (R., p.159.) Deputy Henrie asked if he could pat Mr. Wellard down for 
weapons, “anything illegal, or anything like that.” (R., p.159, 164; State’s Ex. 3, at 
Wellard 2, 7:46–7:53.) Mr. Wellard answered, “Yeah.” (R., p.165; State’s Ex. 3, Wellard 
2, 7:54–7:57.) Mr. Wellard turned to face the car with his hands on the vehicle. 
(R., p.165.) Almost immediately, Mr. Wellard asked, “Well, why do you have to pat me 
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down?” (R., p.165 (emphasis in original); State’s Ex. 3, Wellard 2, 7:57–7:59.) 
Mr. Wellard was gesturing with his right hand, turning towards Deputy Henrie, while his 
left hand remained on the vehicle. (R., p.165; State’s Ex. 1, 34:59–35:09.) Deputy 
Henrie explained that he wanted to make sure Mr. Wellard did not have any weapons 
because Deputy Henrie would be inside the vehicle. (R., p.165; State’s Ex. 3, Wellard 2, 
8:00–8:03.) Mr. Wellard responded, “Oh, I don’t have any weapons.” (R., p.165; State’s 
Ex. 3, Wellard 2, 8:03–8:06.) Mr. Wellard then turned back towards the vehicle, placed 
his left hand back on vehicle, and shook his head “(as if to say ‘no’).” (R., p.165; State’s 
Ex. 1, 35:10–36:12.) Deputy Henrie asked, “So you don’t mind,” and Mr. Wellard gave 
no audible response. (R., p.165; State’s Ex. 3, Wellard 2, 8:04–8:05.) Deputy Henrie 
then stated, “Alright. I just want to make sure,” and began the search. (R., p.165; State’s 
Ex. 3, Wellard 2, 8:05–8:07.) Twenty seconds elapsed from the time Deputy Henrie 
asked Mr. Wellard to step out of the vehicle until he began the search. (State’s Ex. 3, 
Wellard 2, 7:46–8:06.) 
While conducting the pat down search, Deputy Henrie pulled out of Mr. Wellard’s 
pocket what Deputy Henrie said “looks like a camera.” (State’s Ex. 3, Wellard 2, 8:13–
8:30.) Mr. Wellard agreed it was a camera. (State’s Ex. 3, Wellard 2, 8:30–8:33.) As 
Deputy Henrie began to open up the container, Mr. Wellard told him that it was actually 
a set of scales. (State’s Ex. 3, Wellard 2, 8:30–8:41.) Deputy Henrie opened the 
container, verifying it was a scale. (R., p.160; State’s Ex. 3, Wellard 2, 8:40–8:47.) 
Deputy Henrie observed a small amount of crystal residue on top, which he believed to 
be methamphetamine. (R., pp.160, 167.)  
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Deputy Henrie arrested Mr. Wellard. (R., p.160.) Mr. Wellard then informed him 
of his true name, outstanding warrants for his arrest in another county, and his 
possession of marijuana and a pipe on his pocket. (R., p.160.) Deputy Henrie found 
those items in his pocket. (R., p.160.) During his transport to the sheriff’s office, 
Mr. Wellard informed Deputy Henrie that he had methamphetamine in the belt line of his 
pants. (R., p.160.) Deputy Henrie found a baggie of methamphetamine in that area. 
(R., p.160.)  
The State filed a Criminal Complaint, alleging Mr. Wellard committed the crime of 
possession of a controlled substance, methamphetamine, a felony, in violation of 
I.C. § 37-2732(c)(1). (R., pp.8–9.) Following a preliminary hearing, the magistrate bound 
Mr. Wellard over to district court. (R., pp.35–36; see generally Tr. Vol. I,1 p.3, L.1–p.32, 
L.4.) The State filed an Information charging Mr. Wellard with possession of a controlled 
substance. (R., p.37.) The State later filed an Amended Information adding two 
misdemeanor offenses for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. (R., pp.56–
57.)  
 Mr. Wellard filed a motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the 
search of his person and his arrest. (R., pp.58, 62–66.) He argued that the search of his 
person could not be justified as a lawful Terry2 frisk for weapons because there were 
“no circumstances present” for Deputy Henrie to believe Mr. Wellard “was armed and 
dangerous.” (R., p.64.) He also argued that he revoked his consent to the search of his 
                                            
1 There are three transcripts on appeal. The first, cited as Volume I, contains the 
preliminary hearing transcript. The second, cited as Volume II, contains the suppression 
hearing. The third, cited as Volume III, contains the entry of plea hearing and 
sentencing hearing. 
2 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  
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person. (R., pp.64–65.) Finally, he argued there was no probable cause to arrest him for 
the scale, and any statements made after the arrest must be suppressed. (R., p.65.) 
Additionally, Mr. Wellard submitted an affidavit in support of his motion. (Aug. R., pp.1–
3.) The State argued Mr. Wellard did not revoke his consent the search. (R., p.71.) The 
State also argued the evidence would have been inevitably discovered because 
Mr. Wellard would have been arrested due to the outstanding warrants. (R., p.72.) The 
district court held a hearing on Mr. Wellard’s motion. (R., p.78; see generally Tr. Vol. II, 
p.4, L.1–p.15, L.14.) The district court took judicial notice of the preliminary hearing 
transcript and admitted three videos of the traffic stop. (Tr. Vol. II, p.4, L.13–p.5, L.18.) 
No witnesses were called, and the district court took the matter under advisement after 
argument. (Tr. Vol. II, p.6, L.11–p.15, L.11.)  
 The district court issued a written order and later an amended order denying 
Mr. Wellard’s motion. (R., pp.119–131, 156–168.) The district court identified the State’s 
position as claiming Deputy Henrie’s search of Mr. Wellard was lawful due to 
Mr. Wellard’s consent, as opposed to a Terry frisk for officer safety.3 (R., p.164.) The 
district court determined Mr. Wellard consented to the search and did not revoke that 
consent. (R., pp.164–67.) The district court also determined Deputy Henrie had 
probable cause for the arrest. (R., p.167.) But the district court rejected the State’s 
argument that the inevitable discovery doctrine provided an alternative means to justify 
the search of Mr. Wellard. (R., pp.167–68.) The district court reasoned that the doctrine 
would not apply if it had found Mr. Wellard’s consent was invalid or revoked. 
                                            
3 The State’s Brief in Support of State’s Objection to Defendant’s Motion to Suppress 
also did not argue Deputy Henrie’s search of Mr. Wellard was a lawful Terry frisk. 
(R., pp.69–73.)  
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(R., pp.167–68.) Nonetheless, the district court denied Mr. Wellard’s motion to suppress 
because it concluded he did not revoke his consent to search. (R., p.168.) 
 The State and Mr. Wellard entered a plea agreement. (R., pp.179–81; Tr. Vol. III, 
p.4, L.11–p.5, L.9.) Mr. Wellard pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, and 
the State dismissed the misdemeanor charges. (Tr. Vol. III, p.4, L.14–p.5, L.1, p.36, 
Ls.15–16.) Mr. Wellard reserved the right to appeal the district court’s denial of his 
motion to suppress. (Tr. Vol. III, p.16, Ls.3–12, p.18, L.14–p.20, L.7.) The district court 
sentenced him to six years, with three years fixed, and retained jurisdiction. 
(R., pp.202–04; Tr. Vol. III, p.33, L.20–p.34, L.10.) Mr. Wellard filed a timely notice of 




Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Wellard’s motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 





Even though he initially consented to the search, Mr. Wellard asserts that he 
revoked his consent shortly thereafter. For this reason, Mr. Wellard contends the 
warrantless search of his person was unlawful. Due to the unlawful search, the district 
court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained from the initial search 
before his arrest and the subsequent searches after his arrest. 
  
B. Standard Of Review 
 
The Court uses a bifurcated standard to review a district court’s order on a 
motion to suppress. State v. Danney, 153 Idaho 405, 408 (2012). “The Court accepts 
the trial court’s findings of fact if supported by substantial evidence.” State v. Watts, 142 
Idaho 230, 234 (2005). The Court exercises free review of “the trial court’s application of 
constitutional principles to the facts found.” Danney, 153 Idaho at 408. 
  
C. The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Wellard’s Motion To Suppress Because 
Mr. Wellard Revoked His Consent To Search  
 
“The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects citizens from 
unreasonable search and seizure. A search and seizure, conducted without a warrant 
issued on probable cause, is presumptively unreasonable.” State v. Hansen, 138 Idaho 
791, 796 (2003) (citations omitted). Voluntary consent to a search is an exception to the 
warrant requirement, however. State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 482, 488 (2007); State v. 
Jaborra, 143 Idaho 94, 97 (Ct. App. 2006). “It is the State’s burden to prove, by a 
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preponderance of the evidence, that the consent was voluntary rather than the result of 
duress or coercion, direct or implied.” Jaborra, 143 Idaho at 97.  
Mr. Wellard does not challenge the district court’s determination that he initially 
consented to the search of his person.4 (R., pp.159, 164, 165.) Thus, the issue on 
appeal is whether Mr. Wellard revoked his consent.5   
Consent may be revoked even if an individual first had voluntarily consented to 
search. State v. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 151, 154 (Ct. App. 2004); State v. Staatz, 132 Idaho 
693, 696 (Ct. App. 1999). “Inherent in the requirement that consent be voluntary is the 
right of the person to withdraw that consent.” State v. Halseth, 157 Idaho 643, 646 
(2014). After an individual has revoked consent, a subsequent search by law 
enforcement is no longer pursuant to the initially voluntary consent. Thorpe, 141 Idaho 
at 154; see also Staatz, 132 Idaho at 696. The standard for measuring a revocation of 
consent “is that of objective reasonableness, ‘what would the typical reasonable person 
have understood by the exchange between the officer and the subject.’” Thorpe, 141 
Idaho at 154 (quoting Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 251 (1991)); see also Staatz, 
132 Idaho at 696.  
Based on the exchange between Mr. Wellard and Deputy Henrie, a typical 
reasonable person would have understood that Mr. Wellard revoked his consent. As 
argued by Mr. Wellard below, Mr. Wellard “expressed hesitancy” to allow the search. 
                                            
4 Mr. Wellard conceded in the district court that he initially consented to the search. 
(R., pp.65, 164.)  
5 The State cannot argue for the first time on appeal that the search was lawful as a 
Terry frisk for weapons. The State has the burden to establish an exception to the 
warrant requirement. See, e.g., State v. Westlake, 158 Idaho 817, 820 (Ct. App. 2015). 
As found by the district court, the State did not raise the Terry frisk exception as a 
justification for the warrantless search.  
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(R., p.65.) He “did not feel like he could outright refuse to allow the search.” (R., p.65.) 
Similarly, as provided in Mr. Wellard’s affidavit, Mr. Wellard  
did not want to be searched but he did turn around and put his hands back 
on the roof of the vehicle because he believed at that point Deputy Henrie 
would search him regardless and he believed he would be cited for 
resisting and obstructing if he did not comply at that point. 
 
(Aug. R., p.2.) Further, Mr. Wellard’s body language was not clear: he turned toward the 
vehicle, but also shook his head “no” and briefly threw his hands in the air. (State’s Ex. 
1, 34:57–35:11.) In light of the facts, Mr. Wellard submits he revoked consent and 
therefore the search of his person was unlawful. Thus, the district court erred by 
denying his motion to suppress. 
  
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Wellard respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order 
denying his motion to suppress and vacate its judgment of conviction. 
 DATED this 29th day of April, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      JENNY C. SWINFORD 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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